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CHAPTER 5
Two Decades EU Migration Law for
Third Country Nationals
Are There any Integration Challenges Left?
5.1
TinekeStrik
Introduction
As the current Migration Agenda of the Commission has been dominated by
asylum and irregular migration, the political and public debate on legal migra-
tion seems almost absent. At the same time, in European societies integration
of third country nationals has been hotly debated, faelled by the emerging
populist right wing parties and the threat of terrorism. Integration has been
one of the main objectives of EU policy on legal migration, which started to
develop twenty ears ago. It is therefore relevant to assess the extent o which
the EU legal migration instmments have contributed to the integration of
third country nationals: the Family Reunification Directive and the Long-Term
Residents Directive. To what extent do Member States use the directives to
maximise their chances for integration, and what more steps are needed?
5.1.1 History
At the time the Centre for Migration Law was established, the competence for
regulating the rights of third country nationals was still at the national level.
However, the Council had already defined some principles. In 1985, when it
became clear that the residence of third country nationals had acquired a
more permanent character, the Council called on the Member States to coop-
erate in order to promote their integration and participation.1 It referred to its
resolution, adopted in 1974, which emphasized the importance of equal treat-
ment between EU citizens and third country nationals including their family
members regarding their life and work circumstances. The Council explicitly
intervened in the rights of legally residing third country nationals, but oper-
ated cautiously regarding the admission policy of third country nationals.2 At
that ime, a clear competence was absent from the Treaties.3 Until the Treaty
of Maastricht entered into force, cooperation on admission remained outside
the institutional framework of the EEC. In mid-ig97 the Commission intro-
duced a proposal for a Treaty on admission. This proposal served as a model for
the legal migration i struments based on the Treaty of Amsterdam, especially
the Family Reunification Directive and the Long-Term Residents Directive.4
The content of both directives was guided and inspired by the Tampere
conclusions in which the European leaders declared that a vigorous integra-
tion policy would need to grant hird country nationals rights and obligations
comparable to those of EU citizens. According to the conclusions, enhance-
ment of the non-discrimination fthird country nationals in economic, social
and cultural life should be part of this policy.5 The preambles of both direc-
tives make reference to these Tampere conclusions.6 So besides harmoniza-
tion of national policies, integration has always been an important goal of the
European rules on family reunification and long-term residents.
5.1.2 Eqiial Rights?
This firm objective of equal treatment, however, did not prevent he Member
States from retaining clear distinctions between third country nationals and
EU citizens in both directives. Just to mention a few differences: for family re-
unification, Member States are allowed to impose material conditions and to
limit he scope to core family members. During the first five years after admis-
sion, the rights and status of admitted family members remain dependent on
the sponsor falfilling the requirements.
The regime of intra-EU mobility for long-term residents is still a long way
from the right of free movement for Union citizens. Economic activity is insuf-
ficient for settlement in another Member State; instead a minimum income is
required and the second Member State can apply a labour market test, priori-
tizing Union citizens. Furthermore, the free movement is limited to one other
Member State. Any onward settlement is only permitted after five years of resi-
dence in the second Member State.
Despite the remaining distance from Union citizens, both directives have
clearly strengthened the rights of third country nationals in most Member
States. The EU Court of Justice has made clear that family reunification and
the granting of a long-term residence status are subjective EU rights and that
1 Resolution of the Council 16 July 1985 on Guidelines for a communitarian Migration Policy,
Pb C 186,26 July 1985, pp. 0003-0004.
2 Resolution of the Council 21 January 1974 regarding a Social Action Programme, Pb C 013, ia
Febmary 1974, pp. 0003-0004.
3 The legal basis for policies on integration was Article 177 EC Treaty.
4 Articles 63(3) and (4) EC Treaty.
5 Conclusion o. 18.
6 Recital no. 3 of Directive 2003/86 and recital no. 2 of Directive 2003/109.
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the discretion of the Member States is limited to the requirements in the di-
rectives. Both directives entered into force a decade ago, which enables us to
assess their impact.7 To what extent have they enhanced the harmonization of
national policies and the integration of third country nationals? Iwill highlight
the main results below.
5.2 FamUy Reunification
The comparative studies on the transposition of the Family Reunification
Directive show a mbced picture of the impact he directive has had on na-
tional policies.8 On the one hand, the directive led to a liberalisation of the
national policies: some Member States needed to raise their standards, some
had to restrict heir national discretion by introducing the right o family re-
unification in their national egislation.9 This result was achieved despite,
rather than thanks to, the actual aims of the Member States. An analysis of
the negotiations shows that they did not negotiate with a view to harmoni-
zation or integration, but to defend their national legislation and preferably
their discretion.10 It is therefore no surprise that some Member States used the
adoption of the directive as a vehicle for restricting their policies, although
the directive in no way condones to lowering certain standards. Those govern-
ments negotiated restrictive measures into the directive and legitimized them
on the national level by presenting them as transposition. This strategic use of
7 The Family Reunification Directive ntered into force on 3 October 2005, the Long Temi
Residence Directive ntered into force on 23 January 2006.
8 Groenendijk, C.A., R. Femhout, D.P.L.M. van Dam, R. van Oers & M.H.A. Strik (2007), The
family reunification directive in EU member states. The first year of implementation, (report,
Nijmegen Migration Law Working Papers Series, no. 2007/01). Nijmegen: Radboud Univer-
sity Nijmegen. Labayle, H. & Y. Pascouau (2008), Directive 2003/86/EC on the right o family
reunification, synthesis report, in the framework of the 'conformity checking of the transposi-
tion by member states of 10 EC directives in the sector of asylum and immigration', Odysseus
Network. Pascouau, Y. & H. Labayle (2ou), Conditions for family reunification under strain.
A comparative study in nine E u member states, European Policy Centre. Strik, T.i B. De Hart
& E. Nissen (2013), Family reunification: a barrier or facilitator of integration? A compara-
tive study, Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers.
9 Groenendijk, C.A., R. Femhout, D.P.L.M. van Dam, R. van Oers & M.H.A. Strik (2007), The
family reunification directive in EU member states. Thefirstyear of implementation, Centre
for Migration Law, Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2007, paragraph u.i.
10 Strik, T. (2ou), Besiuitvorming over asiel- en migratierichtlijnen. De -wissehverking tussen
nationaal en Europees niveau, Den Haag: Boom Juridische Uitgevers, section 3.2.2, 3.2.3
and 3.7.2.
Europeanization however outweighed the liberal changes that Member States
were forced to make.
Although the transposition has been subject o several studies, less is known
about he impact of the directive and the case law of the Court of Justice after
the transposition process. Can we observe certain tendencies in national pol-
icy changes related to the directive? And does it lead to adjustments in the
decision making practice?
5.2.1 Policies
As the directive limits national discretion and possibilities for regression,
Member States rely on the optional clauses to make their policy more restric-
tive. A lobby for a standstill clause in the directive, prohibiting regressive
changes at national level, had failed." The case of the Netherlands exempli-
fies the impact: after an unsuccessful attempt to persuade the Commission to
propose a more restrictive directive, it decided in 2010 to apply most of the
optional clauses of the directive to restrict he right o family reunification.12
Since these policy changes, the directive has been functioning as standard set-
ting for the Dutch family reunification policies instead of being the bare mini-
mum. This result is in contrast o the formal position the Dutch government
communicated to its parliament at the start of the negotiations on the direc-
tive that it aimed at the highest protection level and insisted on the possibility
to deviate from the norms in the directive in a positive sense.13 As in other
countries, the government's attitude towards family reunification reversed
from perceiving it as a chance to integrate migrants to a threat o social cohe-
sion and integration.
Many governments have used the optional clauses of the directive to adopt
policies from the Netherlands (f.i. the pre-entry test, minimum age level of
21 for spouses, three-month time limit for family reunification for refugees),
and also from other countries. Hence, the search for possibilities to reduce the
number of family migrants within the limits of the directive has had a har-
monizing effect, albeit not in the upward sense that he directive was initially
meant o create. An analysis of the political debates demonstrates huge simi-
larities in the arguments Member States use to justify their estrictions: these
ii Strik, T. (aou), Besluitvorming aver asiei- en migratierichtlynen. De wisselwerking tussen
nationaal en Europees niveau. Den Haag: Boomjuridische Uitgevers, section 3.2.1.
12 'Kabinetsaanpak gezinsmigratiebeleid', 2 October 2009, Kamerstukken II 2009-2010,
32.175, no i (Dutch Parliament); The Coalition Agreement WD-C DA, "Vrijheid enVerant-
woordelijkheid" Chapter 6, 30 September 2010.
13 Kamerstukken 1999-2000,23.490, nr. 154, p. 13 and nr. 158, p. 10 (Dutch Parliament).
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are, apart from promoting integration, protecting the national economy and
preventing fraud.14
5.2.2 Response to Refugees
Recital no. 8 of the Family Reunification Directive recognizes that he situation
of refugees requires special attention due to the compelling reasons for their
flight, which has prevented them from leading a normal family life in their
own country. For this reason, they are entitled to more favourable mles, laid
down in Chapter 5. However, in response to the recent increase in the number
of refugees, many Member States have restricted the right to family reunifi-
cation. With regard to those persons with subsidiary protection, the Austrian
government has suspended their right to family reunification for two years
(an increase from one to three years), and Germany has introduced a suspen-
sion of two years. The Swedish government has suspended family reunification
for all protection categories, suggesting that it will ift the suspension for con-
vention refugees after three years.
Those with subsidiary protection are not covered by the Family Reunifi-
cation Directive, as most Member States rejected the initial Commission's
proposal to include them, arguing that at that ime there was no common defi-
nition of subsidiary protection. The Commission excluded them in its second
proposal, but announced that it would insert a rendez-vous clause in order to
review this decision after adoption.15 Member States now benefit from this le-
gal loophole, not only by introducing these suspension mechanisms, but also
by granting the subsidiary protection status more frequently than before (for
instance to Syrian refugees). It however emains doubtfal if such different
treatment between convention refugees and those with subsidiary protection,
who are in an analogous ituation, is allowed, as Article 14 EC HR requires very
high standards for justification and proportionality.16
With regard to convention refugees, Belgium has reduced the time limit for
application to three months and Sweden has introduced a minimum age limit
of 21 years for both spouses. In several countries the waiting period has or will
be introduced or existing periods extended. The Dutch government has pub-
lished a legislative proposal to expand the time limit for deciding on family
14 Strik, T., B. De Hart & E. Nissen (2013), Family reunification: a barrier or facilitator of
integration? A comparative study, Nijmegen: Wolf Publishers, Chapter 4.
15 See 001^(1999)638, CouncU document no. 6504/00 MIGR 24, i6 March 2000 and
GOM(20oo)624,10 October 2000. See Art. 19 of the directive for the rendez-vous clause.
16 See also "Information note on family reunification for beneficiaries of international pro-
tection in Europe" ECRE/ELENAjune 2016.
reunification for refugees to nine months, which is the minimum norm in the
directive.17
These changes, if at all allowed, clearly mn counter to the objective of
integration. In earlier research, family members often described their lives
during the application procedure as being on hold. Delay in the process means
that the family members live separately, and thus, focus on the process and
not on the host society.18 These conclusions contrast with the objective of inte-
gration, formally used by governments o introduce restrictive admission rules.
The emotional impact is especially strong when refugee parents are separated
from their children, as the constant worrying about he safety of the family
members left behind are detrimental to the wellbeing of the refagee. The de-
lay therefore also affects the refugees' ability to recover from the traumatic
experiences of persecution and war and their capacity to benefit from existing
integration support and learn a new language, search for a job and adapt to
their country of asylum. In a research report on the Netherlands, a Burundian
refugee woman whose family reunification process with her five children took
more than four years stated: 7 came as a young and healthy woman and now
lam a wrecA:'.19 Other esearch confirms that he psychological effect especially
hampers integration, and that he longer the period of separation, the harder
it is to regain the balance within the family.20 These outcomes relate to the
primary aim of refugees: reuniting with their family members.21
17 Kamerstukken n, 2016-2017,34 544 (Dutch Parliament).
i8 Strik, T., B. De Hart & E. Nissen (2013), Family reunification: a barrier or facilitator of
integration? Acomparative study, Nijmegen: Wolf Publishers.
ig Strik, De Hart & Nissen (2013), paragraph 6.5.
20 Marsden, R. & C. Harris (2012), We started life again: integration experiences of refugee
families reuniting in Glasgow, Glasgow: British Red Cross/Scottish Refugee Council, with
reference to RASNZ (2012), Refugee family reunification, mental health and resettlement
outcomes in Aotearoa New Zealand; McDonald-Wilmsen, B.& S. Gifford (2009), 'Refugee
resettlement, family separation and Australia's humanitarian programme', New Issues in
Refugee Research Paper No. i78R; Schweitzer, R. et aL (2006), Trauma, post-migration liv-
ing difficulties, and social support as predicators of psychological djustment in resettled
Sudanese refugees', Austraiian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry, 40, pp. 179-187;
Derluyn, I. et at. (2009), 'Mental health problems in separated refugee adolescents'Jouwa/
of Adolescent Health, 44, pp. 291-297; A. Smith, et aL (2004), 'Serial migration and its im-
plications for the parent-chfld relationship: a retrospective analysis of the experiences
of the children of Caribbean immigrants', Cultural Diversity Ethnic Minority Psychology,
10:2, pp. 107-22.
21 UNHCR (2013), A new beginning: refugee integration in Europe, September 2013, p. 127,
<www.refworld.org/docid/52298o6o4.html>.
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5.2.3 Practice
In all Member States, however, it is not only legislation that determines the
extent o which migrants can exercise a right o family reunification. The way
requirements are applied or assessed and procedures are organized are equal-
ly important for their possibilities to bring their families.22 Jurispmdence has
made clear that he Family Reunification Directive not only impacts the policy
level but also the practical implementation. The Court of Justice has imposed
clear equirements for the examination of individual pplications, whether it
concerns admission or the renewal of the residence permit of family mem-
bers. The EU principles on effectiveness and proportionality oblige national
authorities to assess the application i  light of the aim to further family reuni-
fication, taking into account all individual circumstances, interests and rights
of the Charter. These requirements are not easy to reconcile with the transfor-
mation of immigration authorities in many countries in the past decade, from
a street-level bureaucracy (with daily face to face contact with applicants) to
a system-level (screen-level) bureaucracy (with a computerized, standardized
procedure), which seems to have certain drawbacks for individual applicants
in terms of being able to tell their story.23
In a research study on the impact of the family reunification procedures,
family members mentioned the faceless procedure as a problem, specifically
in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. The respondents complained
that hey could not contact he official who handled their application to pro-
vide information, ask questions or be informed about he state of affairs.24 In
the case of the Netherlands the consistent emphasis on the individual assess-
ment by the Court, has finally compelled the central organized Immigration
and Naturalization Service to transform its practice from a mechanical assess-
ment of the requirements into a fall 'Eu-proof examination, taking a more in-
dividual and active approach. For years the government managed to retain its
practice by framing categorical exemptions as an individual approach. How-
ever, when the national courts became more critical, encouraged by the Court
of Justice, the authorities had no other option than to comply with Union law
on an individual level.
22 Strik, T., B. De Hart & E. Nissen (2013), Family reunification: a barrier or facilitator of
integration? Acomparative study, Nijmegen: Wolf Publishers, p. 109.
23 Backer, A. & B. De Hart, 'Wat zijn de bedoelde en onbedoelde effecten van het migrati-
erecht?', in: Hertogh & Weyers (eds), Recht van onderop. Antwoorden uit de rechtssociolo-
gie, pp. 409-426,2ou, Nijmegen: Ars Aequi Libri.
24 Strik, De Hart & Nissen (2013), paragraph 3.8.
This example shows that governments end to (fully) adjust o the case law
of the Court only if they are forced to on a national level. One-way pressure,
however, is not always ufficient. According to Van derVleuten, compliance by
governments that do not intend to comply only occurs if there is pressure from
both national and European level.23 As the possibility for the Court of Justice
to come up with a decisive mling depends on an action from the Commission
or national judges, the extent o which national governments are being com-
pelled to adjust heir legislation to European case law largely depends on the
position and perseverance of national actors.
5.2.4 Disconnecting Objectives
The negotiation results reached thirteen years ago still determine where the
race to the bottom ends. The harsher the climate towards migrants grows, the
more visible and relevant hese boundaries become. Different national strate-
gies can be observed: restricting policies to the minimum standards, circum-
venting the directive or not complying with its obligations and waiting to see
if courts overturn this decision. The objectives of furthering family reunifica-
tion, harmonization and integration, or the principle that he optional claus-
es should be interpreted strictly (and not in a manner that undermines the
objectives),26 do not seem to be part of the considerations when defining these
strategies.
The more lenient approach at the front door of family reunification,
enforced by case law, seems to trigger two efforts to regain sovereignty. First,
many Member States have intensified their methods to verify family members'
identity or relationship or the genuineness of the marriage or partnership.
These methods, applied on the basis of a wide range of indicative criteria,
cause delays and frustration amongst he applicants. From empirical research
it emerges that many applicants (both the sponsor and the spouse) feel that
they are treated with suspicion, which impedes their feeling of belonging to
the country in which they want o reunite. Nationals of 'nonwestern' countries
feel discriminated against because they are faced with extra authentication
procedures and with more requirements, like the pre-entry test.
Second, there seems to be a tendency towards a more restrictive policy and
practice at the back door. At least in the Netherlands, family members lose their
residence permit more easily when all requirements are no longer fulfilled or
25 Van der Vleuten, A. (1998), 'Two-level interaction as source of influence: the European
Union and equal treatment policies', in: Reinalda, B. & B. Verbeek (eds), Autonomous pol-
icy making by international organizations, London: Routledge, pp. 62-78.
z6 See CJEU 4 March 2010,  -578/08, Chakroun, ECLI:EU:C:20io:u7, paragraph 43.
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when they fail to inform the authorities of changes in their situation. This fuels
their insecurity of residence and hence affects their integration as well.
The overall reluctant attitude of Member States and national immigration
authorities i  quite in contrast with the principles of the Family Reunification
Directive, emphasizing the importance of family reunification as a fundamen-
tal right and its positive impact for the whole society. Pressure will remain
necessary to align the national policies and practices with these principles. In
response to the Dutch lobby to restrict the Family Reunification Directive, the
Commission announced in 2014 that the directive should not be re-opened.
Instead, it should ensure the full implementation of the existing rules, open
infringement procedures where necessary and produce guidelines on identi-
fied issues.27 National courts feel encouraged by the guidelines to critically
scmtinize the decisions of the immigration authorities, but they are cautious
in asking for a preliminary mling. Until now the Commission has refrained
from infringement procedures, but it may be time to conclude that hey have
become necessary. Further esearch on the implementation by street-level
bureaucrats and its impact on family members and their integration process,
could provide substantive information for these judicial steps.
5.3 Long Term Residents
The Long-Term Residents Directive (2003/109) adopted in 2003 applies to third
country nationals who have been residing in a Member State for five years or
more. The Court of Justice has confirmed several times now that the directive
has established a subjective right o the long-term residence status once the
third country national has fulfilled the requirements.28 Recital no. 6 expresses
that the duration of residence in a Member State should be the main criterion
for acquiring the status of long-term resident. Peers describes the directive as
an accomplishment as it facilitates the security of residence, equal treatment
and free movement of third-country nationals.29 Security of residence, being a
central element of the directive, forms the basis for the integration of the third
country national in his or her country of residence. Integration isdescribed as
27 Communication on guidance for application of Directive aoo3/86/EC on the right to
famUy reunification, 001^(2014)210,4 April 2014, p. 2.
28 CJEU 8 November 2012, C-40/u, lida, ECLI:EU:C:20i2:69i; CJEU 26 April 2012,  -508/10,
Commission v The Netherlands, ECLI:EU:C:20i2:243.
29 Peers, S. (2011), Eujiistice andhome affairs law, 3rd edition, Oxford: oup, pp. 478-485.
a key element in promoting economic and social cohesion, which is anchored
in the Treaty as a fundamental objective of the Union.30
5.3.1 Policies
Despite this emphasis on integration as an objective of the directive, fourteen
Member States require applicants to fulfil integration conditions before they
grant EU status.31 They include knowledge of the language of the host country
(at varying levels) and knowledge about he host society - mainly history, legal
order and values. Some Member States require the third country national to
pass an exam after following compulsory courses (which may be expensive)
while others only require attendance at integration courses. In this way the EU
status functions as proof rather than as a tool for integration. At the time the
Commission launched the proposal for the EU Long-Term Residence Directive,
only Germany had a language requirement for its national permanent status.
This shows that Member States, as we saw before with the Family Reunifica-
tion Directive, used the discretion the directive allowed them to restrict he
right o EU status, by adopting policies from other states. Several national ex-
periences have shown that an integration requirement reduces the number of
applications for a permanent status as well as the number of permits issued.32
More third country nationals thus remain with a temporary, more conditional,
status, which is in general not beneficial for their integration.
The directive foresees intra-Member State mobility for long-temi residents
with the possibility of work or residence in a second Member State. Article
14 paragraph 3 of the directive allows the second Member State to apply the
labour market est prioritizing Union citizens in cases of admission for eco-
nomic activities. The restricted access to the labour market can remain during
the first year of residence (Article 21 paragraph 2). Only seven Member States
exempt long-term residence status holders from the labour market test.33 This
means that he large majority doesn't reat labour migrants with a long-term
residence status differently from those entering directly from outside the EU.
Italy and Romania pply a national quota and they also (together with France)
30 See the preamble of the directive, recital nr. 4, and Article 3(3) TEU.
31 GOM(20ii)585,28 September 2ou. These Member States are Austria, the Czech Republic,
Germany, Estonia, Greece, France, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia, Malta, the Neth-
erlands, Portugal and Romania.
32 Strik, T., A. Backer, M. Luiten & R. Van Oers (2012), The INTEC project, synthesis report.
integration and naturalisation tests. The new way to European citizenship', in: Pascouau,
Y. & T. Strik (eds) (2012), Which integration policies for migrants? Interaction between the
E u and its member states, Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers.
33 Belgium, Cyprus, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Portugal and Sweden, cOM(20u)585, p. 7.
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impose a higher income requirement than for the acquisition of a long-term
residence permit.34
5.3-2 Practice
The introduction of the subjective right o the EU long-term status seems dif-
ficult o reconcile with the huge variety between the Member States in the
number of holders of a long-term residence permit. In its evaluation report in
2011, the Commission pointed out that 80 per cent of the LTR status holders
lived in only four Member States: Estonia, Italy, Austria and the Czech Repub-
lie.35 In 2014 there were almost 7 million holders of a permanent residence
permit in the EU, but less than 3 million of them have the EU permit. Austria
and Italy have large numbers: more than 200,000 in Austria nd more than 2
million in Italy. But in Germany and France compared to their high number of
third country nationals, only a handful have been granted LTR status.36
It is likely that hese huge differences reflect national policy choices rather
than the choices of the individual migrants. For some countries pecific ex-
planations can be given. Estonia and Slovenia granted the permit o long-
term residents who did not naturalise after the disintegration f the USSR and
Yugoslavia, in order to avoid large-scale statelessness. This explains why many
of the EU permit holders are nationals of Russia, Ukraine, Serbia and Bosnia.
Other Member States have de facto replaced the national permanent residence
permit with the EU permit (Austria), or have introduced the EU permit as the
first permanent permit.
But these reasons still don't explain why the permit is not applied and grant-
ed in other Member States. Groenendijk points to the relationship between
the EU status and the national permanent residence status. In the Member
States with low numbers of EU permit holders, long-term residents have to
choose between the national permanent status and the EU long-term resi-
dence status, causing a threshold for migrants to invoke their EU rights. In oth-
er countries, the possession of a national permit is a condition for the granting
of the EU permit.37 The less migrants are aware of their ights under EU law
and the benefits of the E u status, the less likely it will be that hey will insist on
the granting of the EU permit without unlawful requirements.
34 The Commission mentions Italy, Romania nd Slovenia.
35 coM(20u)585,28 September 2011, p. 10.
36 Source: Eurostat.
37 Groenendijk, C.A. (2012), 'Chapter 10, long-term residents', in: Peers, S. et aL (2012), EU
immigration and asylum law. Text and commentary, second revised edition, volume 2: EV
immigration law, Leiden-Boston: NijhofF, pp. 327-330.
Another eason for differences in numbers might be the national accessibil-
ity to citizenship. If the requirements are more or less the same, then natu-
ralization has the advantage of acquiring all the rights of a Union citizen. If
naturalization implies the loss of the original nationality, migrants might still
prefer to opt for a strong residence permit. In 2014, the number of naturaliza-
tions in Austria was only 6,000, while in Germany it was 90,000. Despite the
different national situations, the figures imply at least hat he local authorities
in certain states do not actively promote the EU status, or are even not aware
that migrants are entided to the permit. In Italy and the Netherlands, public
campaigning by migrant organisations and lawyers was necessary to enforce
effective access to the status. Again this shows that correct transposition is
only the first step, as implementation atthe practical level determines the ef-
fectiveness of the transposition. But EU compliance also needs knowledge and
awareness by other actors, like lawyers, courts and migrant organisations in
order to create pressure at national and European level.
The lack of awareness among third countiy nationals might also concern
the added value of the EU permit, especially the intra-EU mobility right, due to
the labour market est and the restricted access to the labour market in most
Member States. The Commission observed in 2011 that only small numbers of
LTR third country nationals had made use of this mobility right within the
EU: less than fifty per Member State.38 The labour market est most Member
States apply is probably the main cause of this disappointing number. Jesse re-
fers specifically to this provision while questioning the hannonization purpose
through EU law when the same EU law allows so much discretion that na-
tional implementation can lead to fundamentally different legal situations.39
The provisions on intra-EU mobility and their transposition have clearly not
bridged the gap between TCNS and Union citizens. Besides using the discre-
tion the directive allows, a number of Member States do not comply with the
requirements of a second Member State, like granting equal treatment and
giving full access to the labour market after one year of residence.
5-3-3 New Perspectives
The Commission mainly blames the many deficiencies in the transposition of
the directive and the lack of awareness of the directive for its limited impact.
It however also admits that as the instmment i self is insufficient in promoting
38 COM(20u)585, p. 10.
39 Jesse, M. (2012), 'Integration, access to employment and occupation under EU law', in:
Morano-Foadi, S. & M. Malena (eds), Integration for third country nationals in the Euro-
pean Union. The equality challenge, Cheltenham (UK): Edward Elgar, pp. 145-166.
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mobility, it should be amended by facilitating access to the labour market and
further simplifying the acquisition of LTR status in the second Member State.
As the Commission was dissatisfied with the thresholds for mobility, which
the Member States had established in the directive, it laid down a rendez-vous
clause in Article 24 in which it gave priority to amending Chapter 3 of the di-
rective. In its evaluation report of 2ou the Commission repeated that it would
propose amendments to the directive in order to further promote intra-EU
mobility.40 Five years later, no such amendment has been tabled.
But the number of reasons not to wait any longer to enhance intra-EU mo-
bility is only growing. First, the number of third country nationals living in
the EU on a pennanent basis is rapidly increasing, especially since refugees
and those with subsidiary protection have gained access to the permit. On
1 January 2015 almost 20 million third country nationals lived in the 28 EU
Member States.41 Second, as long as third country nationals are locked up in
their Member State, no real participation i the internal market or integration
into European society as such will be attained. This hampers the achievement
of economic and social cohesion. Third, as the labour market est has created
a de facto higher threshold with the enlargement of the EU in 2004 and later
on, the prioritization of EU citizens has led to more exclusion of TONS. Even
citizens from Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Switzerland have a privileged
position over migrants who have lived in the E u for many ears. Fourth, the ac-
cession and economic risis has led to more competitiveness for third country
nationals in their country of residence. Facing discrimination i  the labour
market, they end up jobless more frequently. Enlarging the scope of job op-
portunities would at least increase their perspective on participation. Lastly,
employers as well as the national welfare systems would benefit from a better
chance for a match in the labour market. The current restrictions on access to
the labour market, although eavily defended, don't favour the Member States
either, while 'isolated labour markets remain unattractive for foreign profes-
sionals'.42 Demographic changes will make this match even more urgent.
Abolishing the labour market est in the second Member State, however,
will not equalise the rights of LTRS and Union citizens. A more far reaching
40 COM(20u)585,p. u.
41 Source: Eurostat.
42 Jesse, M. (2012), 'Integration, access to employment and occupation under EU law', in:
Morano-Foadi, S. & M. Malena (eds), Integration for third country nationals in the European
Union. The equality challenge, Cheltenham (UK): Edward Elgar, pp. 145-166; Kocharov,
A. (2008), 'What intra-community mobility for third-country workers?', European Law
Review, 33, pp. 913-926.
but also more effective step would be to grant hem the right of free move-
ment, for instance by enlarging the personal scope of the Union Citizens
Directive. Article 45 of the Charter offers a legal basis for this. However, the
current negative perception of the free movement of EU citizens makes the
political feasibility of widening the scope within the short or medium term
rather unlikely.
5.4 Conclusions
We have seen antagonistic behaviour by the Member States. The Court con-
tributes to coherence by taking the Member States' aims of equal rights seri-
ously. But the Member States themselves try to limit he consequences of the
jurisprudence, with as one of the results that he gap with EU citizens remains
large. The tendency to minimize the application of certain granted rights also
creates more different categories among third country nationals, leading to
a further fragmentation of their ights. All categories have a different set of
rights: Turkish nationals, long-term residents, Blue Card holders, students and
researchers, other types of workers, family members, refugees, and those with
subsidiary protection. This provokes questions on the justification for all those
differences, and compatibility with the non-discrimination principle, as en-
shrined in Article 18 TFEU and Article 14 ECHR. The objective of the Single
Permit Directive to achieve more equal treatment, has failed due to the many
derogation clauses. And so its impact is again dependent on its use by Mem-
ber States, which until now have shown merely reluctance to strengthen the
legal position of migrants, except with regard to the most wanted ones: the
Blue Card holders. According to Jesse the privileges of the highly skilled third
country nationals exactly concern the lifting of optional restrictions applied
to other TCNS, like waiting periods, pre-entry tests, labour market ests etc. It
is therefore legitimate to question the real purpose of those optional require-
ments, if they have to be removed to attract the wanted immigrants. Prevent-
ing immigration of unwanted immigrants or furthering their integration?43
These restrictions, leading to unequal treatment, are especially problematic
as regards the ones who have settled in the EU permanently, many of them
family members or long-tenn residents. Their rights are based in European
legislation, they live in European societies, hence they de facto belong to the
43 Jesse, M. (2012), 'Integration, access to employment and occupation under EU law', in:
Morano-Foadi, S. & M. Malena (eds), Integration for third country nationals in the Euro-
pean Union. The equality challenge, Cheltenham (ux): Edward EIgar, pp. 145-166.
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European integration as a whole. The European Council endorses the objective
that long-term legally resident third country nationals be offered the opportu-
nity to obtain the nationality of the Member State in which they are resident.
But as access to EU citizenship remains a national competence, integration of
TCNS could be promoted by making nationality less determining of their ights
and participation within the EU. The Commission invented the concept of 'civ-
ic citizenship', inspired by the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which would
enhance successful settlement into society.44 The Commission relaunched this
initiative in 2003 and although it was supported by the European Parliament,
the idea was abandoned in further Communications.45 It is time to think of
a new, similar concept, like membership. This EU membership would still be
based on criteria for inclusion and exclusion, but not along the lines ofnation-
ality, and not to be determined or granted by individual Member States. Mem-
bership could be directly linked to a European rather than a national society,
and safeguard full integration and mobility. Such a concept would reflect he
Tampere objectives of equal rights as well as the promotion of economic and
social cohesion at EU level.
There are numerous remaining research challenges regarding the evolution
of the position of third country nationals within the EU. Academic research
could contribute to gaining insight into the strategic use of the directives by
the Member States and finding explanations for it. Multi-disciplinary research
on the impact of the directives is necessary to conclude to what extent hey
have led to harmonization and integration of TONS or to other, unintended
effects. It could contribute to a much needed evidence-based and rational ap-
proach to European immigration policy furthering harmonization a d integra-
tion. Nowadays facts are widely ignored in the politicized and polarized ebate
on integration. If researchers also look into explanations of the impact of the
directives, they could formulate recommendations on the necessary steps re-
quired to further the aimed integration. In finding ways to reconnect the objec-
tives of the directives, on the one hand, and the Member States on the other
hand, the reluctance of the latter to reduce their discretion should be taken
into account. Perseverance by the Commission is however indispensable,
because of its competence to start infringement procedures and to propose
legislative changes.
44 Communication of the Commission on a Community Immigration Policy, 00^1(2000)757,
22 November 2000.
45 Acosta, D. (2ou), The long-term residence status as a subsidiary form O/EU citizenship. An
analysis of directive 2003/109, Leiden-Boston: Martinus NijhofF Publications, p. 84.
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